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REPLY TO MACHOCK'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
In Fink's Petition for Permission to Appeal, he raised a single issue: 
Issue: Is the three-month statutory limitation period o f 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2000), satisfied by the filing 
of a breach of contract complaint before the foreclosure 
sale and where notice of the sale and the claimed 
deficiency is afterward given to defendant through means 
other than the filing of a complaint? 
It is on this issue that the Supreme Court granted the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
Machock attempts to recharacterize the issues on appeal in his "Statement of Issues." 
Though Machock's issues are, perhaps, another way of asking the s a m e question as 
Fink, the Court should consider only the single issue framed by Fink in his petition.1 
REPLY TO MACHOCK'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his summary judgment motion, Fink complied with Rule 4-501(2)(A), Utah 
Rules of Judicial Administration, by providing a separate statement identifying in the 
record each fact supporting Fink's motion. (R. 199-202.) To survive summary 
judgment, Rule 4-501(2)(B) required Machock to produce evidence showing a fact in 
dispute. Rule 4-501(2)(B) provides that the facts raised by Fink "shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
[Machock]." Id. (emphasis added).2 Machock's response to Fink's statement of facts 
is found in the Record at R. 436-41. 
1
 Machock's Issue No. 1 is inaccurate. As shown below in Point LB. n.4, the 
trial court did not conclude that "Machock's Complaint states a va l id cause of action 
against Fink for breach of contract for payment on an absolute Guarantee." 
This Rule has been replaced by Rule 7(c)(3)(A), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (effective November 1, 2003). 
1 
Fink's statement of facts, and Machock's response, constitute the universe of 
facts considered by the trial court and it is the factual universe that this Court reviews. 
This Court should not consider facts raised for the first time on appeal. Smith v. Four 
Corners Mental Health Or.. Inc., 2003 UT 23, ffi| 40-41, 70 P.3d 904; Lovendahl v. 
Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, fflf 50-52, 63 P.3d 705; Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT 
App 291, t1f 7-9, 77 P.3d 339. The following are "facts" that Machock offers for the 
first time on appeal: 
• In Machock's Brief, at 7, 8-10, 31, and 33-34, he cites t o the parties' 
discovery requests and responses. He admits that these were "not filed with the trial 
court" (Brief of the Appellee ("Machock's Brief), at 7, t 8, & 8, % 12), but he 
attaches them to his appellate brief anyway. Machock never mentioned these 
documents in opposition to Fink's motion (R. 436-41) or in oral argument. They 
should not be considered on appeal. 
• In Machock's Brief, at 14, he claims that "Fink was informed of the 
trustee's sale, but did not bid at the sale. R. at 498." This contention is not based on 
any evidence that was before the trial court. In Machock's opposition to Fink's 
summary judgment motion, at 7, [^ 1 (R. 441), he claimed that notice had been given, 
but he did not offer any evidence to support this claim. Specifically, Machock 
pointed to a letter dated April 18, 2000, but this was written after the foreclosure sale 
- it was not notice. (R. 441 & 463-64.) Machock also referred to a letter dated 
October 4, 1999, but this letter only states that Machock has instructed his attorney to 
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commence foreclosure proceedings - it does not give notice of the t ime or place for a 
sale. (R. 465-66.) 
• In Machock's Brief, at 3, he claims: "The bank's successor 
subsequently foreclosed on the property and was also the successful bidder. R. at 
531, Tr. at 24." Similarly, in Machock's brief at 15, he claims: "Shortly after the 
April 18, 2000 letter, the holder of the first deed of trust [Brighton Bank] foreclosed 
on the Harmer property. R. at 531, Tr. at pp. 24-25." This is a bald assertion made by 
Machock's counsel at oral argument that was never supported as factual in the record 
below. (R. 436-41). As Machock points out elsewhere in his brief, "argument from 
counsel. . . is not evidence." (Machock's Brief, at 24 n.5.) 
None of these facts were in the record before the trial court. This Court should 
not consider them. Even if this Court were to accept these facts as t rue , however, and 
consider them in this appeal, they do not aid Machock's position on the substantive 
issue presented here. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MACHOCK'S BREACH OF CONTRACT 
CLAIM IS BARRED. 
A. Machock Elected Not to Pursue a 
Deficiency Claim. 
At all times, Machock has sought to recover the full value o f the note and 
guaranty on a breach of contract claim. (See, e.g., Machock's Complaint fflj 4-13 & 
Prayer, (R. 1-3)). Machock has never elected to pursue a section 5 7-1-32 deficiency 
claim. At oral argument on Fink's summary judgment motion, Machock's counsel 
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plainly stated that this lawsuit was not a deficiency action under Section 57-1-32. 
(Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing on March 6, 2003 ("Tr."), R. 531, Tr. 
page 22, lines 20-25; R. 502 (Ruling at 7)). When the trial court inquired whether it 
was appropriate to seek a windfall by pursuing a breach of contract claim instead of a 
deficiency, Machock's counsel said it was. (R. 531, Tr. page 27, lines 5-14); R. 501 
(Ruling at 6) ("In the hearing scheduled March 6, 2003, Machock, through counsel, 
argued that it would be entirely appropriate to foreclose on the property owned by 
Harmer . . . and also collect the entire $150,000 from Fink.")). When the trial court 
asked whether a section 57-1-32 deficiency is "something that your client is not even 
asking for," Machock's counsel said it was not. (R. 531, Tr. page 28, lines 4-15.) 
In Machock's appellate brief, he continues to argue that he has the right to sue 
for contract damages independent of section 57-1-32. For example, he argues: 
"Machock's breach of contract claim is based on the absolute Guarantee and is 
therefore independent of any deficiency claim." (Machock's Brief, at 18.) Machock 
asserts further: "Fink's liability to Machock pursuant to the absolute Guarantee was 
In Machock's Brief, at 25, footnote 5, he incorrectly says that his counsel 
"acknowledged that Machock would be preclude from obtaining a double recovery on 
his breach of contract claim. R. at 531, Tr. p. 27." This mischaracterizes the 
discussion between the trial court and Machock's counsel at oral argument. On this 
page of the transcript Machock's counsel argues that Machock can have both the 
foreclosed property and payment in full on the note. R. 531, Tr. page 27, lines 5-14. 
This is the windfall that is prohibited by section 57-1-32. Further down the page, at 
lines 23 through 25, and continuing on the following page, lines 1 through 3, 
Machock's counsel says that he will give Fink a credit for any money paid by Harmer. 
This is a different kind of "double recovery" from the windfall that Machock seeks by 
foreclosing and pursuing contract damages at the same time. (A copy of the pertinent 
pages from the Transcript are attached as Attachment "A".) 
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fixed on September 22, 1999, the date Harmer defaulted on the Note a n d informed 
Machcok that he was unable to make future payments. Nothing in section 57-1-32 
changes this result." (Machock's Brief, at 15.) Throughout his brief, Machock refers 
to his claim as one for breach of contract. (E.g., Machock's Brief, a t 3 , 4, 13, 17, & 
18.) Machock even devotes an entire section of argument to the idea that the trial 
court "ruled that Machock's complaint states a valid cause of action for breach of 
contract," even though this was not part of the trial court's holding. (Machock's 
Brief, at 18.) In any event, this Court should accord no deference to the trial court's 
ruling under the standard of review on appeal. 
Because he failed to file a deficiency claim under section 57-1-32 within three 
months after the foreclosure sale, Machock's claims against Fink a re barred. Surety 
Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Utah 1995). 
B. Machock's Contract Claim is Barred. 
Machock argues that section 57-1-32 "simply provides the m e a n s " whereby he 
can "pursue his breach of contract claim against Fink." (Machock's Brief, at 15.) 
This misunderstands what section 57-1-32 allows. Section 57-1-32 does not enable a 
contract claim. Instead, it prohibits recovery of damages for breacH of contract. In 
4
 Machock accuses Fink of "ignoring] the trial court's Ruling that Machock's 
Complaint states a valid cause of action." (Machock's Brief, at 190 The trial court 
never made such a ruling. While the trial court held that the guaranty was "absolute," 
it never held that Machock had "a valid cause of action" following t h e foreclosure 
sale. Rather, the trial court found Machock's contract claim had to b e modified by the 
requirements of section 57-1-32. (R. 501-02). The trial court rejeoted Machock's 
claim that section 57-1-32 is irrelevant because the guaranty is absolute, saying: 
"None of this matters in light of the very broad, very expansive reading given to 
[section 57-1-32] by the Utah Supreme Court." (R. 501.) 
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Cox v. Green, 696 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1985), the lender attempted to pursue a breach of 
contact claim to recover the balance due on the obligation for which the trust deed 
was given as security. The trial court dismissed the lender's claim, and the Supreme 
Court affirmed, explaining: 
[Sjection 57-1-32 provides the exclusive procedure for 
securing a deficiency judgment following a trustee's sale 
of the real property under a trust deed. Plaintiffs' election 
to sell the property to satisfy the debt precludes them from 
seeking any other remedy, including damages for breach 
of contract, which might have been available to them. 
Id. at 1208 (emphasis added). This principle was reaffirmed in Concepts, Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah 1987) ("Once a trust deed 
sale has been made, that remedy [filing an action for a deficiency under section 57-1-
32] is the exclusive remedy under statute. . . . [The lender's] failure to bring a 
deficiency action within three months after the sale of the property terminated all of 
[the borrower's] remaining obligations"), and in G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. 
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962, 963-64 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("if the beneficiary of a trust 
deed elects to foreclose nonjudicially, is owed a deficiency following application of 
the sale proceeds, and wishes to obtain a deficiency judgment, an action for that 
purpose must be commenced by the beneficiary under that trust deed within three 
months of sale or any claim to a deficiency is waived"). 
Machock tries to distinguish these cases by arguing that they do not apply 
because they did not involve "a separate claim for liability on an absolute guaranty 
that was filed prior to the foreclosure." (Machock's Brief, at 23.) None of those 
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cases, however, held that the timing of the filing of his contract claim made any 
difference. As argued in more detail in Point II.C, below, the policies underlying the 
Cox and Concepts opinions apply regardless of the timing of the filing of the lender's 
claim on the guaranty. Whether or not the lender has previously sued on the guaranty, 
once he elects to hold a trustee's sale, he is foreclosed from pursuing his breach of 
contract claim or any remedy other than a deficiency claim under sect ion 57-1-32. To 
pursue a deficiency action, the lender must file a complaint within t h r e e months of the 
trustee's sale, and this complaint must "set forth the entire amount o f the indebtedness 
which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which such property was sold, 
and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale." Utah Code A n n . § 57-1-32 
(2000). See also Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1995). A lender 
who elects to pursue a breach of contract claim instead of filing a complaint for 
deficiency under section 57-1-32, is barred from pursuing any claim at all. 
Characterizing Fink's guaranty as "absolute," Machock argues that he is not 
subject to the requirements of section 57-1-32. He says that a section 57-1-32 
deficiency action is some "other remed[y]" that he is "not required to pursue." 
(Machock's Brief, at 18.) Machock cites two cases, neither of which supports his 
argument. First, Machock cites to Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way Concrete 
Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This case involved a note and an 
absolute guaranty that was secured by personal property, namely, construction 
equipment and a truck. Id at 106. Since there was no real property at issue in Valley 
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Bank, section 57-1-32 had no application to the case and was not addressed by the 
court. Valley Bank has no application to this appeal. 
Second, Machock cites to In re SLC Ltd. V, 152 B.R. 755 (D. Utah 1993). 
Machock argues that the holding in this case "demonstrates the soundness of the trial 
court's Ruling." (Machock's Brief, at 19.) In SLC Ltd., a bankruptcy court reasoned 
that the protections of section 57-1-32 and Utah's One Action Rule, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-37-1, do not apply to guarantors. Id at 771. This case might support Machock's 
argument, except that two years later the Supreme Court considered this issue and 
reached a different result. In Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 (Utah 1995), 
the Supreme Court held that guarantors are entitled to the protections of section 57-1-
32. (See the discussion of Surety Life, below, Point II.) The doctrine of stare decisis 
requires this Court to follow the decision in Surety Life, not the opinion of the 
bankruptcy court in SLC Ltd. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398, 399 & n.3 (Utah 
1994). 
Section 57-1-32, as interpreted and applied by Cox, Concepts, Adams, and 
Surety Life, is Machock's exclusive remedy. Section 57-1-32 does not allow 
Machock to pursue his contract claim in any form, regardless of the timing of the 
filing of his claim on the guaranty. 
II. SECTION 57-1-32 APPLIES TO THE 
LENDER/GUARANTOR RELATIONSHIP. 
Machock ignores the plain holding of Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1 
(Utah 1995), when he contends that section 57-1-32 does not apply to him. 
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(Machock's Brief, at 20 ("Section 57-1-32 does not address the situation between 
Machock and Fink.").) Machock suggests two reasons why he believes section 57-1-
32 should not apply to him. First, he says: "Nothing in section 57-1-32 address the 
contractual arrangement between Machock and Fink." (Machock's Brief, at 16; see 
also id. at 20 ("Nowhere does section 57-1-32 purport to address the rights and 
obligations of Fink's Guarantee.")) Second, he contends that section 57-1-32 does not 
bar a "prior filed Complaint asserting a valid cause of action on a guaranty of 
payment." (Machock's Brief, page 16; see also page 20). Surety Life disposes of 
each of these arguments. 
A. The Facts of Surety Life Are Materially 
Indistinguishable from the Facts of this 
Case. 
In Surety Life, there was a lender, a borrower, and several guarantors. The 
lender was secured by a trust deed. The guarantors had signed separate, personal 
guaranty agreements. 892 P.2d at 2. When the borrower fell into default, the lender 
sold the real property at trustee's sale and acquired title to the property for a credit bid 
of $1,536,000. Id At the time of the sale, the undisputed fair marlcet value of the 
property was $ 1,860,000, and the unpaid balance due on the promissory note was 
$ 1,839,000. Id Despite the fact that the fair market value of the property exceeded 
the amount owed under the note, the lender sued the guarantors on their guaranties 
seeking to recover $303,000, i ^ , the difference between the lender-'s credit bid and 
the amount owed on the note and guaranties. Id. 
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What the lender sought to recover in Surety Life would have resulted in a 
windfall. Under the lender's theory, it would have the real property (worth more than 
the indebtedness)/?/^ an additional $303,000. Machock filed this contract claim 
hoping to do the same thing that the lender in Surety Life tried to do. The fact that 
Machock filed his suit against Fink before he foreclosed the trust deed makes no 
difference to the anaylsis under the rule of Surety Life. 
B. Surety Life Holds that a Guarantor (Like 
Fink) is entitled to the Protections of 
Section 57-1-32. 
Machock argues that his contract claim is "independent of any deficiency 
claim." (Machock's Brief, at 18.) He argues that Harmer's note and Fink's guaranty 
are separate contracts. (Machock's Brief, at 21.) This argument was advanced by the 
lender in Surety Life, and rejected. The Court said that this was a distinction that "has 
no relevance under section 57-1-32." IcL at 3. The Court saw that section 57-1-32 
"does not concern itself with which contract or instrument the action is founded on," 
but rather it applies to any action "'to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security.'" Id. quoting section 57-1-32. The lender 
in Surety Life was subject to the restrictions of section 57-1-32. 
C. It Makes No Difference that Machock 
Filed his Breach of Contract Claim 
Before the Trustee's Sale. 
Machock argues - without offering any supporting authority — that section 57-
1-32 should not apply to him because it does not "address the effect o f a prior filed 
lawsuit based on an obligation represented by a guaranty of payment." (Machock's 
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Brief, at 20.) He argues that Surety Life is "inapposite" because his complaint was 
filed before the foreclosure and four months before the sale. (Machock's Brief, at 
24.) Machock's argument that the timing of the filing of his contract claim makes all 
the difference has no merit. 
Machock filed this breach of contract lawsuit contemporaneous with the 
commencement of foreclosure proceedings. (Machock's Brief, at 4 , f^lf 1 &2; R. 465-
66.) By failing to file a deficiency claim within three months after t h e foreclosure, 
Machock elected to disregard section 57-1-32. Machock must live w i t h the choice he 
made. The trial court erred when it sua sponte changed Machock's complaint into a 
section 57-1-32 deficiency claim. A court cannot create or imply t h e existence of 
pleadings where there are none. 
Pursuing both extra-judicial foreclosure and a contract claim at the same time 
generates a potentially lucrative windfall for the lender. The purpose of section 57-1-
32 is to protect the borrower and the guarantor from losing the property and still 
having to pay the entire contract indebtedness. In Surety Life, the Cour t explained: 
Because the Act [the Utah Trust Deed Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-19 to -36] does not provide the borrower with 
any right of redemption, it protects the borrower by 
another means: if the lender purchases the trust deed 
property in a nonjudicial foreclosure at less than its fa i r 
market value and then uses the Act to collect a deficiency, 
the lender must credit the fair market value of the property 
Machock's invocation of Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does not 
save him. (Machock's Brief, at 32 n.8.) This rule only applies when an issue not pled 
is "tried by express or implied consent of the parties." As demonstrated by Fink's 
motion for summary judgment and this appeal, Fink will not consent to try a 
deficiency claim that was never pled. 
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against the borrower's debt. Id § 57-1-32. In short, the 
Act prevents trust deed lenders from obtaining excessive 
recoveries. In addition to the fair market value offset 
requirements, the Act has a three-month statute of 
limitations. 
Id. at 2. The filing of a contract claim before the trustee's sale is an attempt to avoid 
this protection. This is especially true for a lender like Machock who filed his 
contract claim at nearly the exact same time that he commenced foreclosure 
proceedings. (Machock's Brief, at 4, ffif 1 & 2; R. 465-66.) Creating a before- and 
after-foreclosure distinction encourages lenders to do what Machock did: disregard 
the pleading and filing requirements of section 57-1-32 by filing a contract claim 
before the sale. If the Court creates this before-and-after distinction, a lender will 
have no reason to comply with section 57-1-32, or file a deficiency claim at all. He 
will simply file a contract claim before the sale for the purpose of skirting the 
limitations imposed by section 57-1-32. The best way to prevent this kind of tactic is 
to require compliance with section 57-1-32 regardless of whether the lender had filed 
a contract claim prior to the sale. If a prior complaint has been filed, a lender must 
file a new complaint or amend the existing complaint within the three-month period 
required by section 57-1-32. That pleading must include all of the facts required by 
the statute, such as the amount for which the property was sold and the fair market 
value at the date of sale. The Legislature has already mandated this requirement 
without distinguishing whether a prior complaint for breach of contract has already 
been filed. This Court should not judicially impose that kind of distinction on the 
statute. This is precisely what the trial court did in the present case when it allowed 
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Machock to go forward with his contract claim "subject to" section 57-1-32 because 
Machock had previously sued Fink on the guaranty. 
Machock chose the same course as the lender in Surety Life. In Surety Life the 
lender did not bring a deficiency action, opting instead to sue for the balance due on 
the note and guaranty. 892 P.2d 2. In light of this election, the Court held that the 
lender was prohibited from proceeding on his contract claim, and it w a s not allowed 
to commence a deficiency claim because more than three months h a d passed since the 
trustee's sale. IcL at 3. In the present case, the trial court created an exception to 
Surety Life, allowing Machock to go forward with his contract claim "subject to" the 
damages limitations provided in section 57-1-32. Machock wants t h i s Court to 
affirm. (Machock's Brief, at 15 & 24 n.5.) The Court in Surety Life did not permit 
the lender to pursue his contract claim, and this Court should follow that result. 
III. KIRKBRIDE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS 
CASE. 
The trial court should have applied Surety Life and dismissed Machock's 
contract claim. Instead, the trial court sua sponte transformed Macliock's contract 
claim into a section 57-1-32 deficiency claim. The trial court did tr i is based on an 
ereoneous interpretation of Standard Federal Savings & Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 
1136 (Utah 1991). Misapprehending Kirkbride, the trial court reasoned that the 
statutory filing and pleading requirements of section 57-1-32 are " a mere procedural 
hurdle" (R. 502) that is satisfied "when 'notice' is given to the debtor." (R. 503). 
This was not the holding of Kirkbride. 
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In Kirkbride, unlike in this case, the lender filed a timely deficiency action 
within the three-month limitations period. When the borrowers discovered that the 
complaint had not been served within 120 days, they moved to dismiss for failure to 
serve under Rule 4(b), and the trial court granted the motion dismissing the complaint 
without prejudice. The lender then re-filed the complaint. Whereupon, the borrowers 
moved to dismiss again, arguing that the second complaint was barred by section 57-
1-32's three-month statute of limitations. Id. at 1137. The lender opposed dismissal 
arguing that it should be allowed to proceed under the savings statute (Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-40) because the second complaint was filed less than o n e year following 
dismissal of the first complaint. Id. The trial agreed to let the second lawsuit 
proceed. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied the savings statute and affirmed. 
Analyzing the interplay between the two statutes, the Court held that the savings 
statute could be applied to a section 57-1-32 deficiency claim. I d at 1138. The Court 
allowed the second lawsuit to proceed because the lender had satisfied section 57-1-
32's three-month limitation by timely filing the first lawsuit. Id ; see also, C.P. v. 
Utah Office of Crime Victims' Reparations, 966 P.2d 1226, 1228-29 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (same). 
The salient fact of Kirkbride is that the lender filed the first deficiency action 
within the three-month limitations period. The reason the first action did not proceed 
to a decision on the merits was because of a procedural failing: the summons had not 
been served in a timely manner. The Court explained that "57-1-32 does not 
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permanently bar further proceedings any time some procedural failing results in the 
dismissal of a, properly filed action." The primary purpose of that section is satisfied, 
held the Court, when "the foreclosing party provides notice to the debt that a 
deficiency will be sought by filing the action" 821 P.2d at 1138. 
Machock is not the victim of some "procedural failing" - like n o t serving the 
second complaint within 120 days - because (unlike the lender in Kirkbride) he never 
filed & first complaint that invoked section 57-1-32 in the first place, and, to date, he 
has never asserted a claim for deficiency in any form. 
Citing to Kirkbride, Machock defends the trial court's ruling b y arguing that 
"the three-month limitation period of section 57-1-32 is a mere procedural hurdle." 
(Machock's Brief, at 25.) This was not the holding in Kirkbride. S u c h an exception 
swallows the rule. If the actual commencement of a lawsuit by filing a complaint is 
now just a "procedural hurdle," then this and all statutes of limitation are meaningless. 
To reach this conclusion this Court would have to distort Kirkbride and all other cases 
applying statutes of limitations. 
In Fink's opening brief, he pointed out that such a rule would encourage non-
compliance with section 57-1-32's strict pleading and filing requirements, and for 
litigants in general it would introduce an unstructured "notice" procedure. Kirkbride 
should not be interpreted to allow such a result. 
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IV. MACHOCK IS NOT ALLOWED TO PURSUE 
A DEFICIENCY BECAUSE HE DID NOT 
COMMENCE A LAWSUIT TO DO SO. 
A. A Plaintiff Commences a Lawsuit by 
Filing a Complaint. 
Section 57-1-32 requires every lender who wishes to pursue a deficiency to 
"commence" a lawsuit for that purpose, and the complaint must "set forth the entire 
amount of the indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for 
which such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale." 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2000). Few statutes have such precise pleading 
requirements. 
Machock argues that these filing and pleading requirements are "tedious and 
inefficient," "unnecessary," "a waste of time," and do "not further the purpose of the 
statute." (Machock's Brief, at 16-17.) In their place he advocates extra-judicial 
"notice." (IcL at 16.) He says that by giving "notice" by means other than the filing 
of a complaint he "eliminat[ed] the need" to file a second lawsuit or amend his 
original complaint. (Id at 17.) This argument conflicts with the plain language of 
section 57-1-32 and the cases interpreting that statute. Under the statute, notice of a 
claim for a deficiency can only be given through the filing of a complaint containing 
certain necessary allegations relating to the foreclosure sale. 
He has never filed a complaint that alleges the elements required by section 57-
1-32, and he has never made a request in this lawsuit to amend his pleading so that it 
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abandons his contract claim in favor of a deficiency claim under section 57-1-32. It is 
now too late for Machock to file a new complaint or amend his pleading. 
B. Machock Never Gave any "Notice" that 
He Intended to Pursue a Deficiency 
Action under Section 57-1-32. 
The only way to give notice of a deficiency claim is by the filing of a 
complaint, but even if section 57-1-32 could be satisfied by giving "not ice" through 
means other than the filing of a complaint, Machock has not given a n y such notice in 
this case. In his brief, at 26 - 28, Machock references five documents that he says are 
"examples of Machock placing Fink on notice that he would pursue a deficiency." 
(Machock's Brief, at 25.) None of these satisfies section 57-1-32's f i l ing and 
pleading requirements, and none of them give "notice" that Machock will pursue a 
deficiency claim: 
• Correspondence dated October 4, 1999 (R. 456-66). T h i s is a demand 
letter threatening to file a complaint that ultimately became the complaint in this case. 
There is no reference in this letter to section 57-1-32, or the fair mairket value as 
required by section 57-1-32. 
• Machock's Complaint (R. 1-3). The complaint contains no allegations 
relating to the foreclosure sale or a claim for a deficiency under sect ion 57-1-32. 
• Correspondence dated April 18, 2000 (R. 436-37). T l i i s letter 
acknowledges that Machock has completed the trustee's sale, and tl iereby taken title 
to the property, but it does not satisfy the pleading requirements of section 57-1-32. It 
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does not state the date of the sale, the amount of the indebtedness, or t he fair market 
value as required by section 57-1-32. 
• Machock's Reply to Fink's Amended Counterclaim, da ted October 3 1 . 
2000 (R. 247-60). In this pleading, Machock continues to assert his contract claim. 
Instead of invoking section 57-1-32 and giving a credit for the fair marke t value of the 
property, Machock says: "this issue has been mooted by the completion of 
foreclosure proceedings against the Harmer residence, which failed to yield any funds 
to satisfy Machock's lien ...." (R. at 255.) Machock eschews the v e r y purpose of 
section 57-1-32: giving a credit based on the fair market value and n o t the price 
yielded at the trustee's sale. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 ("The cour t may not 
render judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of t he indebtedness 
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and at torney 's fees, 
exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale."); Surety Life 
Ins. Co. v. Smith, 892 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1995) (the Act "protects the borrower by" 
requiring the lender to "credit the fair market value of the property agains t the 
borrower's debt."). 
• Machock's Responses to Discovery, dated May 5, 2003 (not in the 
Record).6 Machock claims that his responses to interrogatories constitute notice 
because they are "a pleading addressing the restrictions of section 57-1-32 ." 
Fink objects to the Court's considering Machock's discovery responses, 
which were not before the lower court when it granted summary judgment . Even if 
they are considered, however, they do not support Machock's claim tha t he gave 
notice to Fink. (See above, Fink's Reply to Machock's Statement of Facts , pages 1 -
2.) 
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(Machock's Brief, at 33.) This is flawed for several reasons. First, discovery is not a 
"pleading." Rule 7, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, Machock did not serve 
his discovery responses on Fink until more than three years after the trustee's sale and 
he never filed them with the lower court. Third, and most importantly, the substance 
of Machock's responses do not address the restrictions of section 57-1-32 in any way. 
More than anything, these discovery responses show that Fink is not pursuing a 
statutory deficiency. Fink served these interrogatories after the trial court's ruling, 
asking Machock to explain what he would claim as the statutory deficiency and fair 
market value of the property. Remarkably, even after the trial court 's ruling, 
Machock continued to insist on full contract damages. When Fink asked Machock to 
"State the full amount that you will seek to recover from Fink at trial based on the 
Note and guarantee," Machock responded that he would seek to recover the full 
amount owing on the note and guaranty. (Machock's Brief, Ex. B, Response to 
Interrogatory No. 1.) When Fink asked him to show how he calculated the amount 
owing, Machock responded that this amount is "calculated by determining the unpaid 
principal and interest owed to date pursuant to Fink's Guarantee," Avithout reference 
to the fair market value as required by section 57-1-32 and the trial court's ruling. 
(Machock's Brief, Ex. B, Response to Interrogatory No. 2). When Fink asked 
Machock to state what he thought was the fair market value, and t o show his 
calculation, Machock replied that the fair market value should be determined by the 
amount that Machock bid at the foreclosure sale (which Surety Life held cannot be 
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done. 892 P.2d at 2). (Machock's Brief, Ex. B, Response to Interrogatories No. 3, 4 
&5). 
Even if section 57-1-32 could be satisfied by giving "notice" through means 
other than the filing of a complaint - and it cannot - Machock has not given any such 
notice. 
CONCLUSION 
Fink requests that this Court enter an order reversing the opinion of the trial 
court, and holding that Machock's breach of contract claim is barred and he cannot 
proceed with a section 57-1-32 deficiency action because he never filed a pleading to 
do so within the time allowed by the statute. 
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THE COURT: Yeah, but I'm suggesting that he does get I 
a benefit. 
MR. VEASY: Okay. 
THE COURT: If he does get a benefit, isn't your 
position based on the legal theory that he can sue for the full 
amount on the guaranty because the guarantor has waived his 
right to the collateral for the underlying loan, in this case 
the Trust Deed? 
MR. VEASY: Are you asking? 
THE COURT: I'm asking you. 
MR. VEASY: Well, I-
THE COURT: Because if that's the case, clearly 
! 
there's a windfall and if in indeed that windfall exists, then i 
I 
i 
how does that square with the Surety Life against Smith case? 
MR. VEASY: Different causes of action. One is on a ! 
i 
i 
guarantee which the guarantor signed waiving the rights to the j 
collateral. Besides that, under the Valley Bank case, his debt 
i 
i 
is fixed when Mr. Harmer stops making payments on the note. ' 
THE COURT: But you would agree, if in deed on the 
foreclosure sale of the Trust Deed, that's the collateral for | 
the loan. Then you've got this unconditional guarantee, if the 
lender foreclosures on the Trust Deed and the guarantor doesn't 
protect his right of subrogation, that the lender can take the 
value of the property, let's assume it has a value, and also 
collect full price under the guarantee at the time suit was 
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filed. 
MR. VEASY: If the guarantor gets the property, he 1 
i 
also has the ability to assign his rights over, whether it's ! 
1 
subrogation or otherwise to the guarantor. j 
THE COURT: But the guarantor isn't getting the I 
property. The property is going to the lender which is 
foreclosed. 
MR. VEASY: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And there's value in that property. Now 
you're saying that the lender who has taken the underlying 
collateral, can now sue the guarantor for the full amount of j 
the loan. ] 
MR. VEASY: If the guarantor doesn't protect his 
position. 
THE COURT: I understand where you're coming from. 
MR. VEASY: Okay. Now, on the second issue, again, 
with respect to the argument that Mr. Fink was released from 
his obligations because of a settlement that went on between 
Mr. Harmer and Mr. Machock, again, the guarantee is an 
independent contractual right. Nothing precludes Mr. Harmer 
and Mr. Machock from reaching a resolution on their claim. The 
guarantee is a separate contractual obligation and a separate 
claim. What happens in this one situation is fine, you cannot 
get a double recovery in a windfall because if Mr. Harmer 
totally pays down the debt, the guarantor can't get it twice 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
the windfall but the simple fact that as long as that debt is 
outstanding because of the guarantee of payment, Mr. Fink is on 
the hook for that amount when Mr. Harmer stops making payment. 
THE COURT: When I asked the question to Mr. Tufts 
about the notice and that sort of thing, I applied it to the 
6 j Surety Life Insurance and then applying the formula for 57-1-32 [ 
7 to the measure of damages, he said that's something that your 
8 client is not even asking for or looking at and I take it 
9 that's true, that your position is it's simply a separate 
10 j contract and therefore your client has a right to sue on that 
11 contract and that the release is something that doesn't apply j 
12 for the reasons that you've indicated and the motion should be J 
13 denied and you should be able to proceed then based on the •. 
\ i 
14 j guarantee and collect the full amount? ! 
15 j MR. VEASY: Yes, sir. 
16 I THE COURT: All right. 
17 ! MR. VEASY: And if I may add, and I'll finish up 
18 , here. 
19 ' THE COURT: All right. 
20 ; MR. VEASY: The first argument that the code section 
i 
21 | applies with an existing lawsuit having been filed on a 
22 contractual claim is nonsensical. It flat out is nonsensical 
23 : because what we were saying is, well, then any lawsuit that is 
24 commenced by a guarantor, whether or not a foreclosure has been 
25 commenced that the guarantor under a guarantee of payment is 
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